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This book is a fundamental and welcome contribution to the field of European
private law. Until now, the debate about European private law mainly focused
on the drafting of substantive rules (such as the Principles of European Contract
Law and the rules of the ‘Common Frame of Reference’), on the question of
what are the best methods of harmonization and on whether such harmoniza-
tion is actually needed or possible. The question about so-called ‘governance
design’ was neglected: the consequences of Europeanization for the institutional
setting of private law. As private law operates through both public legislation (of
national and European origin) and private law-making, one important question
is what Europeanization means for the optimal allocation between public and
private regulation: it is not likely that the allocation we have had since the
nineteenth century (in which private law was entirely a matter for the national
States) can remain as it was. A related question is whether European private law
is in need of a governance structure of its own: the legislative products of the
European Union are framed according to policy fields and do not follow the
traditional distinctions between private and public law. The complex inter-
relationship of national and European private law also does not fit the traditional
scheme of a hierarchy of norms familiar to us at the national level.
This volume aims at discussing these (and other) questions of institutional
design in European private law. Apart from the introduction by Fabrizio Cafaggi
(EUI, Florence) and Horatia Muir-Watt (Paris), there are 13 contributions,
loosely organized in four different parts. I will briefly discuss each of these
contributions and end with an overall conclusion.
The first part (‘Different facets of market integration’) contains contributions
by Giuliano Amato (EUI), Michele Taruffo (Pavia), Wolfgang Kerber (Marburg),
Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt (EUI), and Katalin Cseres (Amsterdam). Of
these five authors, Wolfgang Kerber (‘European system of private laws: an eco-
nomic perspective’) comes closest to what the editors had in mind when they
carved out the questions to be addressed in this book. Kerber discusses the factors
influencing the choice of the optimal degree of centralization and decentralization
of legal competences. He identifies seven groups of economic criteria, based on
efficiency, normative criteria, and regulatory competition. This leads him to claim
that mandatory rules should combine minimum harmonization and decen-
tralization while facilitative rules should be part of an optional code. This is an
important insight, but one that the European Commission does not seem to
accept: in its recent draft for a new directive on ‘consumer rights’ (2008), it
proposes full harmonization in the area of consumer protection (typically a field
for mandatory rules).
Kerber’s contribution fits in well with the brief article by Giuliano Amato
about ‘multilevel Europe’ in which the present state of affairs concerning over-
lapping sources of legitimacy and competencies is described in clear wording. As
Amato says: ‘civil law scholars will not receive from Europe the perfect whole-
ness of a civil code’ (p 45) and he is right in stating that while there may be more
than one level of governance, the citizen has the right to expect clear and har-
monious rules. This sketches the true dilemma in making European private law:
as long as private law comes from two different sources (the European and the
national), it is impossible to re-create the unified system that private law once
was. If one also accepts private regulation as a legitimate source of law, the
proper institutional setting is even more difficult to imagine.
The other contributions in Part 1 deal to a much lesser extent with the central
question of governance design. Michele Taruffo discusses the harmonization of
civil litigation in Europe: while a European procedural code is impossible and
undesirable, Taruffo still considers it useful to find a European common core of
procedural law by way of principles, thus allowing the ALI/Unidroit Principles
of Transnational Civil Procedure (2006) to get the attention they deserve.
Taruffo correctly looks at this set of principles as a frame of reference. Engel-
brekt (EUI) and Cseres (Amsterdam) both look into the consequences of the EU
enlargement on private law (in particular consumer law and competition law).
Europeanization of law in the new Member States is different because of the
traditionally different relationship between public and private law in these
countries: the role of the State was much more important and the judicial pro-
fession was always marginalized. The Europeanization process creates challenges
even bigger than those in the old Member States.
Part 2 looks at two non-governmental organizations engaged in private law-
making. While harmonization efforts are now often initiated by private parties,
this must mean something for the institutional design of European private law,
including the requirements the ‘law’-making parties should meet as to legitimacy
and accountability. The first contribution is by Hans van Loon (The Hague),
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who discusses the Hague Convention on Private International Law as a
law-making organization. The interesting experience of the Hague Convention
is that a combination of hard and soft law works best in legitimizing new rules. I
like to think this view is in line with Kerber’s plea to have mandatory minimum
rules where necessary and leave more freedom where possible.
The second article in this part was written by Lance Liebman, director of the
American Law InstĂtute. Liebman’s overview is useful in that it sketches the
criticism expressed against the ALI’s Restatements, criticism that is very similar
to the critique on European sets of principles in the area of private law. First, are
general principles of law possible at all? The American experience shows they
are, albeit that they can be applied to a much greater extent in the US (with one
language and one legal culture) than in Europe. It is not likely that a national
highest court in Europe would hold what the Arizona Supreme Court held in
1938, namely that the Restatements would be followed where Arizona law was
silent. Second, should such recommendations be made by an elite? This is
debated in the United States, where the ALI represents only a small portion of
the country’s legal professionals. In Europe, the discussion is about the demo-
cratic legitimacy of rules such as those in the Draft Common Frame of Refer-
ence for European Private Law (2008). Liebmann is right to suggest that
privately made rules may not have any official authority, but will only exert
influence when the rules are persuasive to those who do act with democratic
legitimacy (such as the legislators and the courts). If this is true, the lack of
democratic input in the European process should be put into perspective. In the
end, Liebman suggests creating a similar institution to the ALI for Europe.
Part 3 looks in more detail at the relationship between governance and
European private law. In a brief contribution, Mark Freedland (Oxford) discusses
the personal work contract in its European and national setting, suggesting this is
a fruitful area for looking into the optimal design of governance—unfortunately,
the relevant questions are only touched upon.
Tony Prosser (Bristol) provides a much needed public law perspective on
governance of private law. In his contribution on ‘Regulatory agencies, reg-
ulatory legitimacy, and European private law’, he rightly assumes that the work
of regulatory authorities cannot be easily classified as either private law or public
law. One only needs to think of regulation of the Internet, financial services,
industry standard-setting, and broadcasting to realize that regulators often make
use of private law tools (such as contracts) to implement regulatory schemes.
This is important because we need to realize that the new European ‘private law’
will be different from the private law that we are familiar with in the national
context. The age-old distinction between private and public law can no longer
be maintained under the influence of Europeanization; Prosser is right to state
that this calls for new forms of legitimacy and for a vision of how to design
appropriate governance arrangements. Although Prosser is right to raise these
questions, he does not provide the answers.
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Colin Scott (Dublin) offers an important analysis of the nature of private
regulation: why would such regulation be binding and why should it be legit-
imate to leave law-making to actors other than governments and parliaments? In
particular the legitimacy question is important when designing an optimal system
of European private law: if private regulation has to have a role in that system, it
should be clear when it is legitimate to leave rule-making to private parties. Scott
shows convincingly that there are several arguments why private rule-making can
be just as legitimate as public legislation. One is that in many cases of public
legislative authority Parliament is not involved either. Another is that legitimacy
does not only have a ‘procedural’ dimension, but also a substantive one: if the
outcomes or effects of rules are generally considered to be ‘right’, we need not
bother too much about the way in which they came about. What this means in
the context of designing a new private law for Europe does not immediately
become clear—other than that private regulation can play a role.
The article by Hugh Collins (LSE) is highly interesting because it takes stock
of how the position of the European Union today differs from that of the
nineteenth century nation States when addressing regulation of civil society
through private law. A first difference is that the EU has only limited compe-
tence, prompting the need for a multi-level private law. Accepting Collins’
insight, one should raise the question how it can be that the Draft Common
Frame of Reference for European Private Law (2008) takes this insight so little
into account: private law at the European level can only be like a code in a very
superficial way and will have to be applied and interpreted differently from
national law. A ‘European Civil Code’ can never ensure uniformity of laws in
the present political constellation in Europe, in which a federal private law court
does not exist and in which there are as many private law cultures as countries. A
second difference is the changing character of private law itself. One aspect of
this is that private law is now often of a regulatory nature; another is that it needs
to take into account (to quote Teubner) ‘transnational sectoral private law
regimes’. The latter point goes to the heart of this book: how to fit such regimes
(for example on private commercial transactions or the lex sportiva) into the
broader institutional setting? Should this be left entirely to private actors or
should the European legislator create default rules? The governance implications
of such choices are quite clear.
The fourth and last part of this book contains one lengthy contribution by
Fabrizio Cafaggi in which he adds his own conclusions. It is a valuable piece of
work that sketches the most important developments and remaining questions
in the area of designing European private law. Cafaggi’s main point is that there
is a strong correlation between the level of harmonization and the necessity of a
governance system: the lower the level of harmonization, the greater the need for
a system of governance. This makes sense as coordination between governance
levels is particularly needed where these levels compete; in a fully harmonized
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system (unlikely to establish at the European level), such coordination is
superfluous.
At a more concrete level, some of the relevant issues are whether to adopt
principle or rule-based legislation and mandatory or default rules. Cafaggi sees
the need for governance of European private law emerge at three different levels:
legislative design, implementation of legislation, and coupling institutions with
legislation to build consumer confidence and address market failures. This focus
on legislative design and implementation brings us to the core of the governance
question. For Cafaggi, total harmonization is not the answer: European private
law should remain a multi-level system, but one that should be better coordi-
nated at both the level of the Commission and of the judiciary. This can be done
by creating a permanent judicial conference specialized in European private law.
All in all, the great merit of this book is that it puts the issue of governance of
private law high on the academic agenda. Several of the contributions (in par-
ticular those of Kerber and Cafaggi) also try to provide concrete answers, but on
the whole the book is better at asking questions than at answering them. This is
no criticism: in this relatively new field—at least when applied to private law—
we may need more questions than answers and the book excels in providing
these questions. It thus sets an important research agenda for the coming years.
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